How an Economist might view the Women's Reservation Bill

Assuming that the goal of "electing a legislator that's best for the constituency/country" is unquestionable and paramount, and the idea "best man/woman for the job" is congruent to this goal, I am baffled with regards to the rationale behind the Women's reservation bill.

Help me out here by selecting one of the possible 4 options (or add some that I may have missed out)

33% Parliamentary reservation for Women in India is a good idea because:

1. Women are better legislators than men 33% of the time more often than you would expect by random chance alone, and all voters are too dumb to figure that out themselves.

2. Women are always better legislators than men, and 33% of the voters are too dumb to figure that out themselves.

3. 33% of the time, a "superior woman legislator" loses to an "inferior male legislator" because of sexist biases in the Indian psyche, and the reverse never occurs. Also, there exists a magical method through which you can identify the 33% of the constituencies that sport this bias, which then allows you to implement a fair "bias countering" mechanism (aka quota).

4. Congress hopes to corner 50% of the vote bank (women - who see them as their champions) without necessarily alienating the other 50% (men, who are afraid of being labeled sexist for opposing this bill). Smartly, BJP doesn’t want to miss out on the action.